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ABSTRACT
User Attitudes About DUO Two-Factor Authentication at BYU
Jonathan W. Dutson
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Bachelor of Science
Simple password-based authentication provides insufficient protection against increasingly common incidents of online identity theft and data loss. Although two-factor
authentication (2FA) provides users with increased protection against attackers, users have
mixed feelings about the usability of 2FA. We surveyed the students, faculty, and staff of
Brigham Young University (BYU) to measure user sentiment about DUO Security, the 2FA
system adopted by BYU in 2017. We find that most users consider DUO to be annoying,
and about half of those surveyed expressed a preference for authentication without using a
second-factor. About half of all participants reported at least one instance of being locked
out of their BYU account because of an inability to authenticate with DUO. Students and
faculty generally had more negative perceptions of DUO than staff. We suggest that user
sentiment about 2FA may most easily be improved by 1) helping users develop a sense of
self-efficacy regarding 2FA and 2) educating users about the risks mitigated by 2FA.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Text-based passwords remain the most common form of online user authentication
today, despite the tremendous amount of research that demonstrates their major security and
usability weaknesses [5], [17], [18]. The number of data breaches is increasing rapidly [13],
and most data breaches involve weak, compromised, or default passwords [1]. In response to
the increasingly apparent problems with passwords, many organizations and individuals have
turned to two-factor authentication (2FA) for to strengthen existing password security.
2FA requires users to present factors from two different categories of authentication.
These categories are something they know (such as a password or the answers to a set of
security questions), something they have (such as a phone or hardware token), and something
they are (a biometric such as a fingerprint or facial recognition). 2FA provides strong
protection against remote attackers, because attackers are not able to compromise user
accounts using passwords alone.
Despite the increased security 2FA brings, voluntary adoption rates remain very
low [19]. One of the reasons for this is that many users perceive 2FA methods as difficult to
adopt [3], [16]. Improving the usability of 2FA may lead to increased adoption.
DUO Security provides its customers with cloud-based 2FA using a variety of 2FA
methods. It provides administrators with a single center for endpoint supervision, policy
creation, and user management. DUO usage is growing rapidly and manages millions of users
and 300 million authentication events every month [2].

1

This study measures the usability of DUO Security as the primary method of two-factor
authentication at Brigham Young University (BYU). We surveyed students, faculty, and
staff who rely on DUO to access their university accounts. We explore potential solutions to
usability flaws revealed during the survey and present recommendations for how to improve
the user experience of DUO at BYU. In addition to being relevant for other institutions that
use DUO, our findings provide insights that may improve the usability of other two-factor
authentication providers.
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Chapter 2
Related Work

Our work builds on prior studies published on the usability of two-factor authentication.

2.1
2.1.1

Summary of Related Work
The importance of usability in security systems

Usability and security are often considered to be competing goals since progress in one often
leads to negative effects for the other [14]. Whitten and Tygar [22] used PGP 5.0 as a
case study to analyze the usability of the standard model of user interface design. They
found the system was unusable for people who were unfamiliar with computer security. For
some participants the lack of usability increased the security risk of the system; a quarter of
the participants sent a secret in an email they mistakenly believed was encrypted. TODO:
Usability has become increasingly important as the growing number of data breaches has
heightened concern about computer security, since usability often determines which software
is successfully deployed and which is not [23].

2.1.2

Perceptions of two-factor authentication usability in general

Research on the usability of two-factor authentication has provided mixed results, with
some studies finding generally favorable perceptions, while others finding strong negative
feelings about the usability of two-factor authentication. De Cristofaro et al. [9] conducted
a Mechanical Turk survey of two-factor authentication users. They found that perceptions
about the usability of two-factor authentication was correlated with user characteristics
3

(such as age or level of education) rather than the specific second-factor technologies used.
Participants found each of the second-factors to be highly usable. The paper suggested that
the high usability scores might be explained by the infrequency with which their users were
required to provide their second factor. Many institutions that offer two-factor authentication
allow browsers to remember a device indefinitely (by storing a cookie associated with the
user login), only requiring a second factor if the device becomes unrecognized (for example, if
cookies are cleared).
In 2011 Gunson et al. [12] published their findings from an experiment investigating user
perceptions of single-factor and two-factor authentication methods in automated telephone
banking. Over 75% of participants rated two-factor authentication as being best for security,
while single-factor authentication was ranked best for convenience and ease of use. Most
participants expressed an overall preference for single-factor authentication, suggesting that
many value convenience and ease of use over security. The high value users place in usability
is key in designing two-factor authentication systems.

2.1.3

The usability of specific second-factor systems

Research on the YubiKey has provided insights into how education and set-up experience can
impact user perceptions on the usability of two-factor authentication. Das et al. [10] recruited
students from STEM degree programs to configure a Yubikey Security Key for the Google
account. Although the Yubikey is considered one of the most usable hardware 2FA devices,
many of the participants struggled with the Yubikey registration process. Most of the paper’s
recommendations focus on providing adequate instruction and education to individuals trying
to register 2FA devices. After Yubico implemented some of their recommendations, Das
et al. measured the Yubikey’s usability again. Compared to the first phase of their study,
they found a 33% increase in the number of users who were able to complete the Yubikey
registration. This shows the impact adequate education can have on the successful use of
two-factor systems.
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Reynolds et al. [20] conducted two studies YubiKey usability to explore differences
between two phases of two-factor authentication: setup and daily-use. Many participants in
the first study struggled to set up the YubiKey and perceived it as being unusable. However,
participants in the second study found the YubiKey to be highly usable in day-to-day usage,
and the majority of users prefered U2F-based two-factor authentication to other second-factor
authentication methods. This suggests that users perceptions of the usability of two-factor
authentication may turn more positive if usability problems in the setup phase can be
improved or eliminated.

2.1.4

Comparing the usability of different two-factor systems

Other important research has been done to compare the usability of different two-factor
systems. Bonneau et al. [5] compared the usability, deployability, and security of 35 password
replacement schemes. They used eight measurements of usability to analyze how each of
the schemes compared with passwords. While they found some password alternatives to be
equally or more usable than passwords in a few of the eight measurements, most alternatives
were rated overall as being less usable than passwords. In addition, none of the systems could
compete with the deployability of passwords.
Krol et al. [16] studied the usability of 2FA in an online banking context. They
interviewed 21 individuals using a variety of second factors (including card readers, hardware
passcode generators, text messages, phone calls, and smartphone apps passcode generators)
and requested that the participants maintain an authentication diary. Krol et al. found that
participant satisfaction was negatively correlated with the use of hardware tokens and the
number of credentials required for authentication. Given that their participants consisted of
relatively young, well-educated individuals who were already familiar with 2FA and online
banking, Krol et al. hypothesize that older or less computer literate groups are put off by
the unusability for online banking 2FA.
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2.1.5

Factors that discourage and encourage two-factor authentication adoption

Ackerman [3] studied factors that encourage or discourage millennials from adopting twofactor authentication. They showed users a video message which articulated the dangers of
cybercrime and recommended two-factor authentication as an action to combat cyber threats.
They found that this educational message increased two-factor authentication adoption, with
31% of participants choosing to adopt two-factor authentication services in the week after
viewing the video. User perceptions of the threat cybercrime posed to them seemed to have
little effect on the user’s choice to adopt two-factor authentication. The most common reasons
participants gave for non-adoption of two-factor authentication were being too busy or being
unconcerned about the threat cyber criminals posed to them.

2.1.6

Usability perceptions of DUO

The work most directly related to ours is a study of the adoption of DUO in a university
setting. Colnage et al. [8] conducted two large-scale surveys at Carnegie Mellon University
(CMU) designed to understand two-factor authentication adoption rates, user sentiments
towards 2FA, and problems experienced with DUO. They surveyed CMU students, faculty,
and staff before and after DUO became mandatory for university employees. Colnage et
al. found that while most individuals who adopted DUO considered 2FA to be annoying,
most also considered 2FA to be easy to use and felt safer with 2FA enabled. While our work
is not a replication study of Colnage et al.’s work (their paper was published after we had
designed and distributed our survey) our methods are similar enough to theirs to merit direct
comparison. We measured similar sentiment constructs using the same 5-point Likert scale,
and in many cases obtained significantly different results. In addition, our study builds on
their work by analyzing the different kinds of devices (e.g., personal mobile device vs. public
desktop computer) used for authentication.

6

2.2

Analysis of Related Work

Our work provides an important perspective on large-scale adoption of two-factor authentication. Much previous work has measured the usability of individuals using a single two-factor
authentication system, but our work studies perceptions of individuals who have multiple
options for authentication. Studies that focus on usability where multiple authentication
options are available are valuable because many real-world companies that offer two-factor
authentication allow users to choose from a variety of second factors. For example, Google
allows users to use voice call, codes sent via text, security keys, verification codes from the
Google Authenticator app, or backup codes [11]. The flexibility that comes from providing
users with a variety of second factors to choose from may impact user perceptions about the
usability of two-factor authentication positively. While similar research has been done by
Colnage et al., the discrepancies in our findings show that further research is necessary to
determine what factors are most influential in user perceptions of the usability of two-factor
authentication.
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Chapter 3
Background

3.1

Description of DUO

DUO is a cloud-based two-factor authentication service provider. Their customers include
a wide variety of businesses and universities. Users select the authentication method they
wish to use as a second factor from DUO’s online UI (seen in Figure 3.1). DUO provides four
authentication methods.
1. DUO Push— This pushes a login request notification to a user’s phone or tablet.
Users review the authentication request and can approve or reject the request with a
tap. This is typically the recommended option, as it is considered more usable than
many of the other options, and is resilient to man-in-the-middle attacks. This method
requires a user to install the DUO Mobile app on their device, and so is only compatible
with smartphones. An example of a DUO Push notification is shown in Figure 3.2.
This method requires an internet connection.
2. Call Me— This option calls the user’s phone. The user authenticates by pressing
any key on their phone or rejects the request by hanging up or ignoring the call. This
method requires cell phone service.
3. Passcode— Users may authenticate by entering a passcode into the DUO prompt.
Passcodes can be obtained in four different ways:
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Figure 3.1: The UI for BYU’s DUO prompt
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Figure 3.2: Example of DUO push sent to a device registered with DUO at BYU

10

Figure 3.3: A hardware token produced by DUO
(a) DUO Mobile— The DUO Mobile app uses a time-based one-time password (TOTP)
algorithm to generate passcodes. The app does not require an internet connection
or mobile service to generate codes.
(b) SMS — DUO can send one-time passcodes through SMS messages. Administrators
can choose to send up to ten passcodes at a time. This requires cell phone service.
(c) Hardware token— DUO supports HMAC-based one-time password (HOTP) compatible hardware tokens. These tokens use a cryptographic hash method along
with a secret key shared between the hardware token and DUO to generate a series
of passwords. Most hardware tokens have a single button which the user presses
to advance the counter to the next passcode. Since the online DUO authenticator
and the token increment the counter independently, if a user presses the button
multiple times without using the passcodes the token may fall out of sync with
DUO. If this happens, a DUO administrator must resync the hardware token
before it can be used to generate valid passcodes. While phones, tablets, and
U2F tokens can be added by a user, hardware tokens must be added by a DUO
administrator. DUO sells their own hardware tokens such as the one seen in Figure
3.3, but also supports compatible third-party tokens.
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Figure 3.4: The YubiKey 4 U2F device
(d) Provided by administrator — DUO administrators may provide temporary passcodes (called bypass codes) for specific users. Bypass codes can be set up to expire
after a certain time limit, after a specified number of authentications, or to be
valid indefinitely.
4. U2F Security Key— DUO supports Universal Second Factor (U2F) security keys
such as the YubiKey (seen in Figure 3.4) or Google’s Titan. To authenticate with a
U2F key, a user must insert the device into a USB port and tap or press a button
on their key. This method requires that users log in with a U2F supported browser
(currently only Chrome or Opera).
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Chapter 4
Methodology

4.1

Study Design

We created and distributed a 30 question survey designed to better understand:
• What threats people perceive against their school account
• How people feel DUO protects them against threats
• Common DUO usability concerns
The survey was approved by our institution’s institutional review board. To be eligible to
take the survey, a person had to be 18 or older, a current student, faculty, or staff at BYU,
and have DUO enabled for their BYU account.
The first eight questions collected demographics, which we used to determine whether a
person was eligible to take the survey. The next twenty questions focused on the respondents’
perceptions about the usability of DUO and on how the respondent typically interacted with
DUO. These questions included nine questions on a 5-point Likert scale:
1. Concern about compromise: I am concerned about my BYU account being compromised.
2. Concern about cyber-criminals: It is likely that my BYU account will be a target
for cyber-criminals.
3. Concern about friends and/or acquaintances: I believe people I know might try
to compromise/access my BYU account.
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4. Ease of use: DUO is easy to use.
5. Feelings of security: DUO makes me feel more secure about my BYU account.
6. Feelings of annoyance: I feel annoyed when I have to use DUO to log into my BYU
account.
7. Concern about addition time for authentication: DUO adds an inconvenient
amount of additional time to logging into my BYU account.
8. Glad for DUO: I am glad that I have DUO enabled for my BYU account.
9. Would rather not have DUO: I would prefer if BYU did not use DUO.
In our results section, we analysis the six of these variables we found most relevant, dropping
“Concern about addition time for authentication”, “Concern about cyber-criminals”, and
“Concern about friends and/or acquaintances”.
We asked questions about how often participants authenticated through DUO, which
authentication methods they used most often, whether they had two-factor authentication
enabled for another account, and whether they had ever been unable to access their BYU
account because of DUO. We included two free response questions; the first asked participants
to share circumstances in which they were unable to access their account because of an
inability to authenticate with DUO, and the second allowed participants to share either
positive or negative experiences they had with DUO. Qualitiative analysis was done by one
researcher, who identified common problems reported by users and coded answers to the
free response questions. Responses from the first question were coded into categories of the
reasons individuals gave for why they could not access their account (e.g., inability to access
phone, technical problems, or lack of cell service). Answers to the second question were coded
as positive, negative or neutral experiences. The final two questions allowed participants to
choose to enter a drawing for one of twenty-one Amazon gift cards.
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4.2

Recruitment

We distributed our survey through BYU University Communications. They sent one email
was sent to all students and another to all full-time and part-time university employees.
The recruitment text used in survey distribution is found in Appendix B. The survey was
distributed near the end of the academic school year, with the assumption that new students,
faculty, and staff would be most likely to have experience with DUO near the end of the
academic year. During the three week survey availability period, we received 4,480 responses.
We dropped 205 responses from individuals who were ineligible or who did not complete the
survey, leaving 4,275 completed surveys for analysis.

4.3

Demographics

Our study took place at Brigham Young University, a private university in the western United
States. BYU has a student body of about 33,500, and employs at least 5,000 faculty and staff.
Our 4,275 respondents represent an approximate response rate of 11% of BYU’s student,
faculty, and staff population. We had a slightly higher response rate from faculty and staff
compared with students, but each group had a response rate above 10%.
Because our results are representative of the BYU population, participants were
primarily students (3543; 83%) and young adults aged 18-24 years (3091; 72%) and 25-34
years (611; 14%). Slightly more respondents identified as female (2411; 56%) compared to
male (1847; 43%), although BYU’s female to male ratio skews the other way (52% male to
48% female for student enrollment).

4.4

Drawing

To incentivize participation in the survey, individuals who completed the survey were asked if
they wanted to enter in a drawing for a number of Amazon gift cards. We randomly selected
20 participants to receive a 15$ gift card, and 1 participant to receive a $100 gift card.
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Chapter 5
Results

Our survey contained both qualitative and quantitative questions. The quantitative
data includes demographic data, Likert scale questions measuring user sentiment about the
usability of DUO, and questions providing information about the details about the user’s
typical login experience (i.e. what methods they use as their second factor, whether they have
ever been locked out of their account because of the requirement for 2FA, etc.). The survey
contained two open-ended questions. The first asked users who had ever been unable to
access their account because of DUO to explain the circumstances that prevented them from
authenticating. The second question allowed users to share positive or negative experiences
they had had with DUO at BYU. In this section, we present the results of our quantitative
data, insights from the qualitative data, and a discussion of our results in the context of
usable two-factor authentication.

5.1
5.1.1

Quantitative Results
Usability Perceptions

The majority of survey participants felt more secure with DUO enabled for their BYU
accounts (54.8%) and felt it was easy it use (56.0%). Despite this, respondents generally
found DUO to be annoying (86.1%) and nearly half expressed that they would prefer if
BYU did not use DUO (49.8%). Few respondents (22.7%) were concerned about their BYU
accounts being compromised. Nearly half (47.1%) of respondents reported at least one
instance of being unable to access their BYU account because of an inability to authenticate
16

Figure 5.1: Distribution of agreement for 6 statements about DUO’s usability
with DUO. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of agreement for 6 statements related to DUO’s
usability.

5.1.2

DUO Authentication methods

DUO Push was the most popular authentication method by far, with 81% of respondents
reporting that they always or usually used DUO push to authenticate. 12% of participants
reported they always or usually used the “Call Me” option, making it the second most
common authentication method. A smaller percentage relied primarily on passcodes to
authenticate, while virtually no one used the U2F token as their primary authentication
method.

5.1.3

Differences between students, faculty, and staff

While Colnage et al. [8] found that faculty and staff they analyzed “presented similar opinions
and behaviors,” our analysis found faculty perceptions regarding DUO’s usability to be
generally closer to students than to staff, with the exception of concern about account
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compromise. In every measure, staff had the most positive perceptions of DUO’s usability.
Student’s had the worst perceptions in every case except for one; slightly more students
found DUO to be easy to use than did faculty. Figure 5.2 compares how faculty, students,
and staff responded to six questions related to the usability of DUO1 . Each effect value seen
in table 5.1 represents a significant difference with an effect size considered small according
to Cohen’s definition [7], except the “Concerned about compromise” effect size, which is
considered a medium effect.
Characteristic

χ2

Prefer not enabled
Glad DUO is enabled
DUO is annoying
DUO increases feeling of security
DUO is easy to use
Concerned about compromise

205.50
252.46
292.11
111.91
109.91
442.34

<
<
<
<
<
<

p

ϕ

0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001

0.16
0.17
0.18
0.11
0.11
0.23

Table 5.1: Chi-square tests of independence between students, faculty, and staff

Most faculty (62%) reported at least one instance where they were unable to access
their BYU account because of DUO, compared with nearly half (49%) of students and
relatively few (31%) of staff. Relatively few students (27%) had 2FA enabled on another
account as compared with faculty and staff (40% and 47% respectively).
We found no striking differences in the choice of DUO authentication methods between
students, faculty, and staff. DUO push was the most popular method across the board,
followed by the phone call option, then the passcodes, and finally the U2F token.
Although students and faculty opinions about DUO’s usability were closer than staff
opinions, faculty device usage was closer to staff than it was to students. As seen in table
5.2, students used personal computers, public computers, and mobile phones more often than
1

We converted the five-point Likert scale questions into a binary Agree or Do Not Agree variable. We
used Pearsons chi-squared test to determine whether there was a significant association between whether an
individual’s status as student, faculty, or staff and their agreement with the six usability questions. Individuals
who responded with “Neither agree nor disagree” were considered part of the Do Not Agree group.
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of distribution of agreement between students, faculty, and staff
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Student
Faculty
Staff

Personal
Mobile
85%
68%
64%

Personal
Computer
94%
76%
62%

Work
Computer
37%
88%
88%

Public
Computer
27%
14%
1%

Table 5.2: Comparison of devices used for authentication at least weekly
faculty and staff, while faculty and staff were more likely to use work computers than their
students.

5.2

Qualitative Results

We received 1806 responses from individuals describing circumstances in which they were
unable to access their BYU account because of DUO. Of the 1806 individuals who shared
the circumstances in which they were unable to access their BYU account because of DUO,
over half (53%) reported the incident being related to an inability to access the cell phone
they had registered with DUO. This included devices that were lost, stolen, left at home or
somewhere else, out of battery, or otherwise inaccessible. Other major reasons people were
prevented from logging in with DUO included technical issues (such as bugs in the DUO
app), being out of cell service, a lack of knowledge about how to use DUO, switching to a
new phone, and challenges setting up DUO for the first time.
1454 people responded to our open-ended question inviting them to share positive or
negative feelings about DUO. In this section, we analyze some of their comments to present
insights about the usability of DUO.

5.2.1

Lack of education about DUO’s features

Many individuals at BYU are not aware of all of the features DUO offers and limit themselves
to using less convenient second factors. Some respondents felt like they did not receive
adequate training on DUO when it became required for accessing sensitive information on
BYU accounts.
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P3665:

“My only concern is that it wasn’t explained super well when it first

started. I didn’t understand the different options for using duo push.”
P3939: “It would have been helpful if someone had explained DUO at the start
of the semester.”
P2826: “No one told us how DUO worked, but my parents were needing my tax
info, so we went in, set up DUO and got the tax info. My phone had poor service
where I was, so my dad used his phone number and it was really messed up. That
whole night I was unable to access my account. I spent a week communicating
with the IT office to get it fixed. It was so frustrating, even though it was our
own fault. We just didn’t know what it was or how it worked or why it had to be
there.”
Although SMS codes are often one of the most common and convenient second-factors [15]
some respondents were not aware that they could receive text codes through DUO. Others
were unaware of the option to remember their device for 30 days. Multiple respondents
expressed frustration at having to move to a place with cell service or wifi in order to
authenticate.
P4074: “I work in a lab that doesn’t always have good WiFi service (and has
no cell service). I need to run down the hall to answer any calls from DUO.”
P3727: “It’s just frustrating when you are in a classroom with bad wi-fi and it
asks for a DuoPush and I have to run frantically down a hallway to get to wifi
access before the push expires.”
Only the “Call Me” or “Text me new codes” options require cell service, and only the DUO
push option requires Wi-Fi. The DUO Mobile app, which is required for the DUO push
option, also includes an HMAC-based One-time Password (HOTP) generator. HOTP codes
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are generated without Wi-Fi and could save students and professors from running around
when Wi-Fi or cell service is poor.
Some respondents learned about important DUO features for the first time while
participating in our survey.
P1107: “I didn’t know that I could just enable a text message code. If I had
known that, I would have done that...”
P4069: “I have to login to servers all day long and hate having to go thru DUO
at least 20-30 times a day... I never noticed the ’Remember me for 30 days’ as I
blew past the irritation! Guess I will try it now...”
5.2.2

The impact of education on perceptions of usability

Some participants were not aware of central DUO features, such as the option to remember a
device.
P1107:

“I hate opening [the DUO] app, and it took me three months before

someone pointed out that I could tell the login to remember me for 30 days. Before
I found that, it was an incredible annoying hassle.”
respondents recognized being properly trained about how to use DUO impacted their perception about DUO’s usability.
P3256: “I spent time learning the ropes at the beginning, carry passcodes as a
backup, and have had no trouble.”
P3447: “I’m not a fan of the system, but I also don’t feel like I’ve been adequately
trained.”
5.2.3

Lack of concern about BYU account compromise

Many respondents expressed that they were not concerned with the consequences if an
attacker was able to access their university account.
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P876: “No one I know has had a problem with BYU security before, and even if
someone does breach the account, there isn’t really an unrepairable issue someone
could do. Someone sees my grades, I don’t care. Someone try to pay my financial
center bills, I pay them immediately anyway. Someone drops or withdraws from a
class, I can talk with the university and explain it and continue with my life.”
Others said they would like to have DUO enabled for their financial information, but not for
other functions of their BYU account.
P2801: “I understand the point of duo and think it makes a lot of sense for
health information and payroll and stuff. It’s just obnoxious when all you want to
do is check learning suite (BYU’s learning management system) from a campus
computer”
P2960: “If someone wants to do my homework for me, go ahead and let them
submit it for me. Just put the second authentification on pages like Registrar, or
Financial Center.”

5.2.4

Misperceptions about how DUO protects

Some of the frustration with DUO stemmed from a misunderstanding about the purpose of
DUO in protecting an online account. Many respondents expressed concerned that DUO
would not protect them if their mobile phone was stolen.
P3268: “What worries me is that if a person steals your phone, gets in (which
supposedly isn’t too hard), and accesses your BYU account, can’t they do the DUO
from the phone as well?”
P2171: “I don’t understand this - So someone can’t get into my account from
a computer, but if they have my phone they have all that they need to get in.
Honestly I am more concerned about having my phone stolen, it is an easier object
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to steal. So all a person has to do is take my phone, get the DUO code, and login!
I really don’t feel like this has made my account safer.”
While it is true that an attacker may be able to use a stolen mobile phone to authenticate
with DUO, the attacker would also need to know the individual’s username and password
to access their university account. In addition, smartphones must be unlocked before they
can be used as a second factor for DUO, and most smartphones require a pin, passcode, or
biometric in order to unlock the phone. No respondent acknowledged that a physical second
factor protects their account from remote attackers. One respondent suggested that
P851:

“Maybe if students were more educated about why it is important, we

would be less annoyed about using it.”
Educating DUO users about how two-factor authentication protects their account could
decrease annoyance surrounding the use of 2FA systems.

5.2.5

Reliance on cell phones

Many respondents expressed frustration that DUO increased their reliance on cell phones.
One staff member was disappointed that they could no longer implement a no-phone policy
among their employees.
P4083: “With Duo I cannot reasonably ask employees to leave their phones in
their backpacks and still expect that they are going to be able to get to the programs
they need to get to without their phones.”
While hardware passcode generators and U2F keys can be used as alternatives to phones, the
physical tokens were not well advertised.
P3684: “We were not told about the tokens available in the bookstore originally.
One of my colleagues did not have a cellphone nor any desire to get one.”
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Some individuals who used the hardware passcode generator complained about the devices
failing or getting unsynced. Although DUO was adopted at BYU over a year ago, knowledge
about hardware tokens remains low. BYU’s IT website on hardware token information states
that users who want to purchase a hardware token can ask about one at the BYU Store
register. When we visited the store and asked about the tokens, most employees we talked
with had heard nothing about these tokens. After talking to multiple employees, we found one
who knew about the DUO hardware tokens, although none of the employees knew anything
about U2F devices being sold at the BYU store. One survey respondent complained that the
BYU store did not carry Yubikey devices. Since then the BYU store has stocked or restocked
YubiKeys.

5.2.6

Internet filters and safe browsing

Four users attributed difficulties with DUO to their usage of internet filters.
P2087: “The DUO log in screen is blocked by certain web filters, which doesn’t
let me use my BYU account on my phone and iPad. VERY ANNOYING.”
15 users mentioned not being able to log into DUO on Apple devices or browsers. Many
attributed this to Apple’s safe browsing functionality.
P907: “When restrictions are enabled on Apple phones, it will block the DUO
login, and the page won’t load, so I am blocked from my account. I finally worked
with OIT, and they helped me add the DUO platform manually, so the phone
wouldn’t block the website anymore.”
White-listing “duo.byu.edu” solved this for some users, while others simply disabled their
web content restrictions so they could access DUO. Android users did not experience this
issue, although 5 users mentioned having difficulty receive push notifications on their Android
phones.
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5.2.7

Desires for DUO policy changes

DUO is only required for certain pages hosted by BYU, but once an individual is enrolled they
are unable to access any page that requires a BYU login without authenticating with DUO.
Multiple survey respondents expressed a desire that DUO only protect sensitive personal
information (i.e. the pages where DUO is required to obtain access). In particular, some
participants expressed a wish that they could access BYU’s Learning Management System
(called Learning Suite) without authenticating with DUO.
P2352: “I think DUO is a great idea. I would like to see it used ONLY for the
financial center portion. I really do not care if someone can hack learning suit,
but I would LOVE to see it involved in everything that has to do with TAX and
with FINANCES.”
P2421: “I am glad to have it when I log into things like my financial center,
but it feels excessive to have it on Learning Suite.”
Some users felt that 30 days is too short a period for the “Remember Me” option.
P3413:

“The two factor authentication is not remembered for long enough.

Google only requires renewal once on a computer or when you change your password.
Every month is kind of annoying especially since checking the “remember me” box
doesn’t always work.”
DUO allows the Remembered Devices policy setting to remember users for up to 365 days [21].
Increasing the length of time devices can be remembered may improve DUO’s usability for
many users.
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Chapter 6
Discussion of Results

6.1

Comparison with Colnage et al.

While our work is not a replication study of Colnage et al.’s work, our work may be productively
compared with theirs. We asked questions related to three of the six constructs measured by
Colnage et al. While the questions were phrased differently, we used the same 5-point Likert
scale. The wording of the questions can be seen in table 6.1, along with the percentages of
participants (with DUO activated) who agreed strongly or somewhat to the statement.
The differences between perceptions about the usability of two-factor authentication
between the two universities are striking, especially since both institutions use the same
two-factor authentication provider. There are many reasons why such a discrepancy might
exist. The survey at BYU asked questions in relation to DUO specifically, as opposed to
the survey at CMU asking about two-factor authentication in general. While the DUO
login experience is nearly equivalent at BYU and CMU (the DUO Mobile app is used across
Brigham Young University
Annoying I feel annoyed when I have to use
DUO to log in to my BYU account.
(86%)
Easy
DUO is easy to use. (56%)
Security

DUO makes me feel more secure
about my BYU account. (55%)

Carnegie Mellon University
I think that two-factor authentication
is annoying to use. (51%)
I think that two-factor authentication
is easy to use. (63%)
Activating two-factor authentication
makes my account less likely to be
compromised. (88%)

Table 6.1: Comparison of user sentiment at BYU and CMU
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institutions, and both universities use the same authentication methods) the circumstances in
which interaction with DUO is required vary between the universities. For example, Colnage
et al. describe how students at CMU are required to use DUO to set up an app called
CBORD which can be used to unlock university dorm rooms. BYU has no app with similar
functionality. While differences in the wording of questions in the survey and differences in
the circumstances in which users are required to use a second factor may account for some
of the differences between the universities, we hypothesize that variations in the way the
universities publicized and educated their populations about DUO may account for a large
part of the discrepancies. Our qualitative results suggest that negative perceptions about
DUO are tied to a lack of education about the multiple authentication methods DUO offers
and misunderstandings about how DUO protects online accounts. Some participants in our
survey felt that BYU did not provide adequate education about DUO before rolling out the
system. Further research is necessary to test our hypothesis and determine other factors that
influence differences in perceptions about the usability of two-factor authentication.

6.2

The need for education

At BYU the perception of DUO’s usability is low, with half of surveyed DUO users expressing
a preference for not using the two-factor authentication system. Much of the frustration
expressed in the free-response section of the survey was related to a lack of understanding
about how to set up and use DUO. Educating users about DUO could mitigate much
of this frustration. BYU maintains a website dedicated to information related to DUO
(https://duo.byu.edu/) which gives instructions for how to enroll in DUO and provides
answers for frequently asked questions. Apparently many users are not familiar with the
information found on the website since the provided information could solve many of the
problems users reported in the survey. For example, although the FAQ section of the
site explains how a user can authenticate without cellular service or Wi-Fi, many survey
respondents seemed to believe they could not authenticate without service or Wi-Fi.
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Figure 6.1: The “Need Help?” link on the DUO Prompt
BYU’s DUO prompt has a link titled “Need help?” on the left of the prompt (seen in
Figure 6.1). This link provides the address of BYU’s DUO support website and the phone
number and email of BYU’s Office of Information Technology. While this information may be
helpful to some, it seems that it is insufficient for educating the BYU population about DUO.
Individuals may not seek out information about DUO until they are required to log in but
are unable to authenticate with a second factor. Some survey respondents reported feeling
rushed to authenticate in such situations, which may make them less likely to spend time
investigating the help options provided in the link. Because it may be difficult to obtain the
necessary help or information when unable to authenticate, it is best if users are educated
about the two-factor authentication methods offered by DUO before such a situation arises.
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6.3

Recommendations

We believe providing better instruction about DUO may be the best way to improve perceptions of the usability of two-factor authentication at BYU. Educational video messages can
be used to help users understand the security benefits of 2FA and develop self-efficacy [4].
Users who understand the benefits of two-factor authentication and who are confident in
their ability to use the system are likely to have more positive perceptions of the usability
of two-factor authentication. In addition to education, DUO policy changes may improve
user sentiment, perhaps at the cost of some security. While trade-offs between usability and
security must be discussed before any system changes are implemented, BYU might consider
making changes to DUO policy (see section 5.2.7).
The DUO Prompt should be redesigned based on user feedback. We recommend three
specific UI changes that would improve user sentiment towards DUO.
1. The “Remember me for 30 days” box should be made larger and more prominent,
perhaps moved to be directly beneath “Choose an authentication method.” The current
design may lead users to push one of the green buttons without seeing the “Remember
me” box.
2. Increasing the conspicuousness of the “Need Help?” link will allow users who are
struggling to log in to more easily find the information they need.
3. Put an indication next to each authentication option to inform users which methods
require Wi-Fi or cell service and which methods do not. This would assist users who
are unaware of methods they can use without Wi-Fi or cell service.
Finally, we suggest that DUO provide an authenticator app that could be installed
on a desktop or laptop they own. This would provide more flexibility in what devices users
can choose to register as second factors and could benefit the many users who are at least
occasionally unable to access their mobile devices.
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6.4

Limitations

Participants were recruited exclusively from the population of students, faculty, and staff
at BYU. Our findings may not be as relevant to other populations. Since respondents were
self-selected volunteers, our survey is influenced by voluntary response bias. Individuals
with strong feelings about DUO or two-factor authentication may have been more likely to
take our survey. When designing the survey we were not aware that BYU offered hardcode
passcode generators, and so did not include a question about the frequency of hardcode
passcode generator use in our survey.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion

DUO may proclaim itself to be “The Most Loved Company in Security” [6] but it is
not loved by the majority of BYU’s population. Students and faculty generally had similar
perceptions about the poor usability of DUO, while staff typically had much more positive
perceptions. Almost half of survey respondents reported at least one instance of being locked
out of their BYU account because of an inability to authenticate with DUO. Many of these
instances would have been preventable if users had a better understanding about the variety
of authentication methods DUO offers. Educating users is central to improving usability
perceptions of a population.
The dramatic differences between user sentiments at BYU and CMU show that further
work is needed to determine what factors are most influential in user perceptions of the
usability of two-factor authentication. While the DUO experience at BYU and CMU is
not identical, the variation of user sentiment towards the same two-factor authentication
system at two universities suggests that user perceptions about the usability of two-factor
authentication may be improved without needing to change the technical aspects of the
system.
Future research is also needed to analyze the impact of two-factor authentication
policy changes on usability and security. We hypothesize that user perceptions of the usability
of two-factor authentication increase with longer “Remember Me” periods. It is possible that
such a policy change might increase the number of fraudulent user authentications. Research
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in this area could help organizations make better decisions about what tradeoffs between
usability and security are acceptable to make.
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[14] R. Kainda, I. Fléchais, and A. W. Roscoe, “Security and usability: Analysis and
evaluation”, in 2010 International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security,
Feb. 2010, pp. 275–282. doi: 10.1109/ARES.2010.77.
[15] A. Kemshall, “Why mobile two-factor authentication makes sense”, Network Security,
vol. 2011, no. 4, pp. 9–12, 2011, issn: 1353-4858. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/
S1353- 4858(11)70038- 1. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S1353485811700381.

35

[16] K. Krol, E. Philippou, E. D. Cristofaro, and M. A. Sasse, “”they brought in the horrible
key ring thing!” analysing the usability of two-factor authentication in UK online
banking”, CoRR, vol. abs/1501.04434, 2015. arXiv: 1501.04434. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.04434.
[17] N. Kumar, “Password in practice: An usability survey”, Journal of Global Research
in Computer Science, vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 107–112, May 2011. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.jgrcs.info/index.php/jgrcs/article/view/96/96.
[18] R. Morris and K. Thompson, “Password security: A case history”, Commun. ACM,
vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 594–597, Nov. 1979, issn: 0001-0782. doi: 10.1145/359168.359172.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/359168.359172.
[19] T. Petsas, G. Tsirantonakis, E. Athanasopoulos, and S. Ioannidis, “Two-factor Authentication: Is the World Ready? Quantifying 2FA Adoption”, in Eighth European
Workshop on System Security (EuroSEC), ACM, 2015, p. 4.
[20] Reynolds, Joshua and Smith, Trevor and Reese, Ken and Dickinson, Luke and Ruoti,
Scott and Seamons, Kent, “A Tale of Two Studies: The Best and Worst of YubiKey
Usability”, in 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), IEEE, 2018.
[21] Using remembered devices authorized networks controls. [Online]. Available: https:
//duo.com/docs/remembered-devices.
[22] A. Whitten and J. D. Tygar, “Why johnny can’t encrypt: A usability evaluation of pgp
5.0”, in Proceedings of the 8th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume
8, ser. SSYM’99, Washington, D.C.: USENIX Association, 1999, pp. 14–14. [Online].
Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1251421.1251435.
[23] M. E. Zurko and R. T. Simon, “User-centered security”, in Proceedings of the 1996
Workshop on New Security Paradigms, ser. NSPW ’96, Lake Arrowhead, California,
USA: ACM, 1996, pp. 27–33, isbn: 0-89791-944-0. doi: 10.1145/304851.304859.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/304851.304859.
36

Appendices

37

Appendix A
Survey Questions

38

5/19/2018

Qualtrics Survey Software

Survey Eligibility

DUO Two-factor Authentication (2FA)
This research study is being conducted by the Internet Security Research Lab at
Brigham Young University under the supervision of Dr. Kent Seamons, a faculty member
in the Computer Science Department.
Participation in this research study is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any
time or refuse to participate entirely.
Your participation in this study will require the completion of the following survey which
should take approximately 5 minutes of your time. If you are eligible and choose to
complete the survey, you may enter into a drawing to win an Amazon gift card by
providing your email address. We will randomly select 21 winners to receive either a
$100 gift card (1 winner) or a $15 gift card (20 winners). We anticipate approximately
1,000 survey participants.
This survey involves minimal risk to you. The benefits, however, may impact society by
helping increase knowledge about the usability of two-factor authentication.
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Kent Seamons, PhD by
email at seamons@cs.byu.edu or by phone at (801) 422-3722 for further information.
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, please contact the
IRB Administrator by email at irb@byu.edu, by phone at (801) 422-1461, or at the
following address:

https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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A-285 ASB
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
The completion of this survey implies your consent to participate.

Are you currently a student, faculty, or staff at Brigham Young University (BYU)?
Yes
No

Here is an example of the BYU Account Login Screen. If you have a BYU account, this
screen will appear when you are required to log into your BYU account. Please refer to
this when answering the following question.

https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Do you currently have a BYU online account?
Yes
No

I am a...
Student
Faculty
Staff

Please select your major.

Which department or college are you primarily affiliated with?

Here is an example of the BYU DUO Login Screen. If you have DUO enabled for your
BYU account, it will sometimes appear when you log into your BYU account. Please refer
to this when answering the following question.

https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Have you used this screen when logging into your BYU account?
Yes
No

What is your age?
Under 18
18 - 24
25 - 34
35 - 44
45 - 54
54 - 65
65 or older

https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Demographics

What is your gender?
Female
Male
Other
Prefer not to answer

What is your marital status?
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never married
Prefer not to answer

Questions

I am concerned about my BYU account being compromised.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

It is likely that my BYU account will be a target for cyber-criminals.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Strongly disagree

When you see this screen, you are using the Duo system to login to your account. We
will ask you a few questions about the Duo system in this survey.

I believe people I know might try to compromise/access my BYU account.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

DUO is easy to use.
https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

DUO makes me feel more secure about my BYU account.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

I feel annoyed when I have to use DUO to log in to my BYU account .
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

How often do you use a DUO second factor (i.e. push notification, text message) to
authenticate to your BYU account?
Daily
2-3 times a week
Once a week
2-3 times a month
Once a month
Less than once a month
Never

DUO adds an inconvenient amount of additional time to logging into my BYU account.
https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

I am glad that I have DUO enabled for my BYU account.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

I would prefer if BYU did not use DUO.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

Here is an example of the BYU DUO Login Screen. Please refer to this when answering
the following question.

https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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For each of the following DUO authentication methods, rate how often you use them.
Always

Usually

Sometimes

Rarely

Never

I don't
know

DUO Push
Call Me
Passcode (from DUO
app)
Passcode (from text
message)
U2F Token (e.g.,
YubiKey)

Rate the following devices by how often you access your BYU account on them.

https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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Daily

2-3
times a
week

Once a
week

2-3 times
a month

Once a
month

Less
than
once a
month

Never

A personal mobile
phone
A personal computer
A work or school
computer that only I
use
A public computer
A friend or family
member's mobile
phone
A friend or family
member's computer

For each of the following devices, when you are logging onto your BYU account, do you
typically check the box to remember you for 30 days?
Yes

No

A personal mobile
phone
A personal computer
A work or school
computer that only I
use
A public computer
A friend or family
member's mobile
phone
A friend or family
member's computer

Have you ever been unable to access your BYU account because of DUO?

Yes
No

https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview
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How many times has this happened to you?

Under what circumstances were you unable to access your BYU account? If you feel
comfortable, share what happened.

Have you ever had to contact customer support to help you with DUO?

Yes
No

How did you contact support?
In-person visit
Online/email
Phone call
Other

I have second factor authentication (i.e., DUO, Google Authenticator, text message
codes, etc.) enabled for an account other than my BYU account.
Yes
No

If you have had a positive or negative experience with DUO you would like to share, please share it here.
https://byu.az1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSurveyPrintPreview

11/12

5/19/2018

Qualtrics Survey Software

Amazon gift card drawing

Thank you for participating in our survey. Would you like to be entered into a drawing to
win a $100 Amazon gift card, or one of twenty $15 Amazon gift cards? To enter you must
provide an email address. The email address will not be shared with a third party, nor will
it be sold or used for purposes other than for distributing gift cards should you win the
drawing. We will not store your email address following gift card distribution.
Yes
No

Please enter your email here.
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Appendix B
Survey Distribution

Figure B.1: Recruitment text and link distributed in email sent to BYU students
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Figure B.2: Recruitment text and link distributed in email sent to BYU faculty and staff
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